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THE CABLE INDUSTRY: REGULATION REVISITED IN
THE CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND COMPETITION ACT OF 1992
"If it moves, regulate it. If it doesn't move, kick it.
Then if it moves regulate it."'
-- Alfred C. Sikes
"Doublethink means the power of holding two contra-
dictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and ac-
cepting both of them."2
-- George Orwell
For several decades, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"), Congress,
and the courts have sought to define the boundaries
of cable television regulation. Since the FCC first ex-
ercised its jurisdictional authority to regulate the
cable industry in the 1960s, the Commission has en-
deavored to balance the imposition of regulatory con-
trols which curtail anticompetitive behavior with
deregulatory measures that promote growth and
technological advancement.
In the early 1980s, after two decades of regula-
tion, many of the restrictions governing the cable in-
dustry were lifted. By the late 1980s, the deregulated
cable industry attained a position of substantial
power in the video programming market, thereby in-
voking consumer complaints about high prices and
poor service.3 After several years of failed cable leg-
islation and in the midst of a heated 1992 election
year, Congress prevailed in its battle to reregulate
the cable industry.4 On October 5, 1992, in an his-
1 FCC Chairman Sikes commenting on the Commission's
current regulatory situation. See FCC Commissioners Seeking
Alternative to Cable Rate-of-Return Regulation, COMM. DAILY,
Oct. 23, 1992, at 2.
2 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 176 (New American Library
1982) (1949).
3 See In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Com-
mission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television
Service, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962, para. 6 (1990)[hereinafter FCC
Cable Report].
" In early 1991, the Senate introduced a key piece of cable
legislation. S. 12, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A year later,
the House introduced a companion bill. H.R. 4850, 102nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Congress had also proposed similar cable
legislation which never went into effect. H.R. 1303, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2063, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
toric veto override,5 Congress enacted the Cable Tel-
evision Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 ("1992 Cable Act").'
The 1992 Cable Act has been a source of contro-
versy for several reasons. First, the Act requires that
the FCC implement a rate regulatory regime that
balances the establishment of a "reasonable" rate
with the assurance of a "reasonable" profit. Those
conflicting demands in the 1992 Cable Act are fur-
ther complicated by the imposition of "must carry,"
retransmission consent, customer service and equip-
ment compatibility requirements, all of which im-
pose additional costs on cable systems. Second, oppo-
nents of the 1992 Cable Act have claimed that the
Act is heavy-handed and unnecessary, in light of in-
creasing competition in the video programming in-
dustry. While the purpose of the 1992 Cable Act is
to "control further rate increases until more competi-
tion develops in the cable industry,"' this goal could
have been accomplished with more streamlined legis-
lation and further encouragement of competition in
the video programming market.
This Comment explores the significance of the
1992 Cable Act. Part I defines "cable television" and
outlines the history of cable television regulation. It
then discusses how the FCC, Congress and the
courts have taken deregulatory action to promote the
growth of the cable industry, and how those institu-
tions have found, as a result of such deregulation,
Some opponents of the 1992 cable legislation maintained that the
cable bill, proclaimed as pro-consumer, was being vigorously
pursued by the Democratic party in an effort to embarrass Pres-
ident Bush, who vowed to veto the bill in his bid for reelection.
See Tom Shales, Unsound Bites To Kill The Cable Bill, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 1992, at D3.
' Using the presidential veto power for the thirty-sixth time,
President Bush refused to sign the cable legislation into law.
However, for the first time during the Bush Administration,
Congress overrode the veto and enacted the cable bill. See Mike
Mills, Bush Asks for a Sign of Loyalty; Congress Changes the
Channel, 50 CONG. Q. 3147-48 (1992).
0 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
(1992).
' See Mike Mills, Cable TV Reregulation, 50 CONG. Q.
3518, 3518 (1992).
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that the cable industry has gained too much power
in the video programming market. Part II explains
both the FCC's and Congress' strategies for control-
ling the cable industry's position in the video pro-
gramming market. Part III analyzes the impact of
the 1992 Cable Act on the cable industry and pro-
poses that the onerous and conflicting rate regulation
requirements of the Act will do little to reduce con-
sumer rates. It then illustrates that the competitive
provisions of the 1992 Cable Act that govern
franchising and programming access, as well as re-
cent FCC decisions promoting competition in the
cable marketplace, show more promise of effectively
controlling cable rate increases and improving cable
service. Part IV concludes that a far less comprehen-
sive law would have gone further in fulfilling Con-
gress' stated objectives.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. What is Cable Television?
Cable television, originally known as Community
Antenna Television ("CATV"),8 evolved in 1948 out
of the need for television service in areas of poor re-
ception.' Cable television is a system of antennas
strategically placed in areas of good reception that
pick up a broadcast signal and transmit it along a
' At first, the FCC referred to cable as "community antenna
television" because the service entailed the reception of broadcast
signals via microwave antennas. The signals were then passed
along by wire to the subscriber. As the types of service ex-
panded, the FCC adopted the all-encompassing term of "cable
television service." In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community
Antenna Television Systems, Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d
143, 144 n.9, on recons., 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972), arid sub
nom., American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344
(9th Cir. 1975)[hereinafter Cable Television Report and Order].
9 1 CHARLES D. FERRIS ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION LAW:
A VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE GUIDE 5.03, at 5-4, 5-
5 (1992). Many rural areas remained unserved because of sev-
eral policy decisions made by the FCC that imposed a four-year
freeze on the processing of new television stations and placed an
emphasis on community-oriented television stations. In re
Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148, para. 2
(1952).
10 1 FERRIS et al., supra note 9, % 5.02. The broadcast sig-
nals are picked up from local signals, microwave relay stations
or satellites and are then amplified and converted into cable
channel frequencies. The resulting electrical impulses are sent to
a coaxial cable that creates a magnetic field which prevents fre-
quency loss. This results in a large signal carrying capacity. The
coaxial cable then carries the signal to smaller feeder cables
which are attached to public utility poles or buried underground.
coaxial cable to a subscriber's home.10 Currently,
many cable systems are employing the use of fiber
optics, a new technology that increases channel ca-
pacity and the quality of the signal. 1
Cable systems offer many programming options
that include local broadcast channels, satellite-deliv-
ered programming and locally originated cable-
casts. 2 The subscriber pays a service fee that varies
depending on the number and type of options se-
lected. There is typically a flat fee for basic service
that includes all local stations and community pro-
gramming.' Additional charges may then be as-
sessed for specialty programming such as Home Box
Office, Showtime and "pay-per-view" services. 4
B. History of Cable Regulation
In 1962, the FCC asserted its jurisdictional au-
thority in In re Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp.15 to regulate microwave-served cable television
amid concern about the effect that cable television's
unlimited importation of distant signals into local
broadcast markets might have on local television ser-
vice. 6 Then, in 1965, the Commission imposed
rules17 upon microwave cable systems that required
mandatory signal carriage,' nonduplication of local
programming,19 and limits on the importation of dis-
Connected to those feeder cables are additional feeder cables
leading to a subscriber's home. Id.
" JAMES C. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND
BUSINESS ASPECTS OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION § 5.02[5]
(1992).11 1 FERRIS et al., supra note 9, f 5.03.
13 DANIEL L. BRENNER & MONROE E. PRICE, CABLE TEL-
EVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO: LAW AND POL-
ICY § 7.01, at 7-2 (5th ed. 1992).
"' Id. "Pay-per-view" is a service that provides movies,
sporting events, concerts or specials in which viewers pay for
each program ordered. Id. § 17.02. Essentially, a program sup-
plier produces a particular event and markets it to a cable sys-
tem operator, which, in turn, markets the event to its customers.
Id.
15 In Re Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C.
459 (1962), afTd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 951 (1963).
16 Id. at 463-64.
17 In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part II, to adopt Rules
and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the
Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Televi-
sion Signals to Community Antenna Systems, First Report and
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
I1 These "must carry" rules required a cable television sys-
tem to retransmit local television signals over its system on re-
quest and without compensation. Id. paras. 85-92.
1 The "nonduplication rules" prohibited a cable system
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tant signals. 20 Less than one year later, the FCC
subjected all cable television systems-not just micro-
wave-served cable-to the rules adopted in the First
Report and Order.21
In the 1968 decision United States v. Southwest-
ern Cable Co.,22 the Supreme Court affirmed the
FCC's jurisdiction over cable television systems
based on Title I of the Communications Act of
1934 .2 The Court essentially reversed the decision
of the Ninth Circuit and held that "the Commis-
sion's authority over 'all interstate . . . communica-
tion by wire or radio' permits the regulation of
CATV systems." '24 Moreover, the Court found that
granting the FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable sys-
tems was necessary in order to achieve the Commis-
sion's goal of ensuring "orderly development" of na-
tional television service.25 At the same time, however,
the Court restricted the FCC's authority to "that
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the reg-
ulation of television broadcasting."12 6
Over the following twenty years, the rules gov-
erning cable television went through many modifica-
tions as the Commission and the courts attempted to
define the boundaries of cable regulation. In 1972,
the FCC adopted a comprehensive set of rules gov-
from duplicating, within a twenty-four-hour period, local broad-
cast programming by way of importation of a distant broadcast
signal. Id. paras. 93-100.
20 Id.
21 In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules
and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the
Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Televi-
sion Signals to Community Antenna Systems, Second Report
and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, para. 1 (1966).
2 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968). In the facts of this proceeding, Midwest Television, lo-
cated in San Diego, had filed a petition with the FCC seeking
relief from Southwestern Cable's transmission of signals from
the Los Angeles area into the San Diego area. Id. at 159-60.
23 Id. at 178.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 177.
26 Id. at 178.
" Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 8.
2' Id. paras. 171-88.
Id. paras. 177-88.
20 Id. para. 82. The "must carry" rules required all cable
systems to carry, on request, "the signals of all stations licensed
to communities within thirty-five miles of the cable system's
community." Id.
31 Id. paras. 120-24. The rules governing leased access re-
quired cable operators with 3,500 or more subscribers in the top
100 market to have at least twenty channels and to designate at
least four of those channels for public, government or educa-
tional use. Id.
2 Id. paras. 97-100. The "syndicated exclusivity" rules pro-
erning the regulation and licensing of cable televi-
sion."' The 1972 rulemaking decision developed a
dual system of federal-state/local jurisdiction over
cable systems.28 The rules established standards that
gave local governments the authority to delineate
franchise areas, ensure construction of cable facili-
ties, establish duration of franchises, regulate sub-
scriber rates and handle service complaints. 29 The
FCC maintained control over the operational aspects
of cable systems and set forth rules for signal car-
riage,30 public and leased access channels,"1 syndi-
cated programming exclusivity 2  and technical
standards. 3
In 1979, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope
of the FCC's authority to regulate cable television in
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.3 4 The Court held that
Commission's rules requiring cable operators to
make leased access channels available for public,
governmental and educational use imposed common
carrier obligations upon cable operators and ex-
ceeded the FCC's jurisdictional authority.35 The
Court found that the rules were not "reasonably an-
cillary to the effective performance of [the Commis-
sion's] various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting."36 Five years later, in Capi-
tal Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,37 the Supreme Court
hibited duplication of syndicated programming. Id. at 233. The
FCC rules defined a syndicated program as "any program sold,
licensed, distributed or offered to television station licensees in
more than one market within the United States other than as
network programming .... ." 47 C.F.R. § 76.7(hh)(ii) (1991).
3 Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 8, paras.
149-70.
34 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
35 Id. at 708-09.
3' Id. (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157, 178 (1968)). The Court distinguished its earlier deci-
sion in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. which upheld the
FCC's power to promulgate rules establishing origination re-
quirements for cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers. Id.
(discussing United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649
(1972)). The Court in FCC v. Midwest Video distinguished the
United States v. Midwest Video decision on the basis that in the
former case, the origination requirements permitted the cable
operator to maintain control over programming, whereas in the
latter case, the access rules did not allow the cable operator any
control over the programming content of the mandatory leased
access channels. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 700-
01.
37 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
An Oklahoma law forbade cable systems operating in the state
from transmitting out-of-state signals with programming that
contained advertisements for alcoholic beverages. See OKLA.
STAT., tit. 37, § 516 (1981). At the time of that proceeding, the
FCC had "must carry" rules requiring cable operators to carry
certain broadcast signals over their systems. See supra note 29.
That requirement conflicted with the Oklahoma law.
1993]
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expanded the FCC's jurisdiction over cable and reaf-
firmed the Commission's authority to regulate the
operational aspects of cable systems."8 The Supreme
Court permitted the FCC to preempt the Oklahoma
law that conflicted with the FCC's "must carry" re-
quirements. The Court found that such preemption
was necessary for the FCC to effectively regulate na-
tional communications and promote the goal of
bringing diverse programming to consumers.3 9
1. Deregulation and the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the FCC, the
courts and Congress took action to deregulate cable
television. The Supreme Court's decision in FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp. required the FCC to eliminate
its leased access requirements.4" The Commission
promulgated rules which allocated some jurisdic-
tional authority to the states and abolished franchis-
ing standards.4 In addition, the Commission elimi-
nated its distant signal carriage and syndicated
exclusivity requirements on the grounds that the
rules had a detrimental effect on competition.42
Congress, seeking to promote the growth of the
cable television industry and to establish a national
policy for cable communications, enacted the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("1984 Cable
Act").4 The 1984 Cable Act maintained the dual
federal-state/local regulatory system established by
38 Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 704-05.
a Id. at 704.
40 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
41 In re Amendment of Subparts B and C of Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules Pertaining to Applications for Certificates
of Compliance and Federal-State/Local Regulatory Relation-
ships, Report and Order, 66 F.C.C.2d 380 (1977).
"' In re CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Re-
port and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), affld, Malrite TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1143 (1982). The FCC found that the rules imposed in-
creased costs upon consumers, denied subscribers certain ser-
vices, and restricted diversity in programming by denying new
cable services to many communities. Id.
"' 1984 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988)). Many provi-
sions of the 1984 Cable Act have since been amended in the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). For the first
time, the 1984 Cable Act defined "cable service" as: "(A) the
one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming,
or (ii) other programming service; and (B) subscriber interac-
tion, if any, which is required for the selection of such video
programming or other programming service." Pub. L. No. 98-
549, § 602(5). Two-way transmission services, which provide
data and voice communications to business and residential cus-
the FCC in the 1970s, but it limited the exercise of
local authority.4 For example, the 1984 Cable Act
deregulated cable service rates, streamlined franchise
requirements and set minimal access requirements. 5
Moreover, section 623 of the 1984 Cable Act limited
the FCC, state and franchising authorities'4" power
to regulate the rates of cable service providers.4" Sec-
tion 623 also prohibited the regulation of rates for
nonbasic service4 and confined the franchising au-
thorities' regulation of basic service rates to those
cable systems not subject to effective competition.49
In compliance with the 1984 Cable Act, the FCC
issued a Report and Order that defined effective
competition and established the basis for rate regula-
tion."0 In the Report and Order, the Commission
stated that a cable system was subject to effective
competition if three or more off-air broadcast signals
existed in a given market.5 ' The FCC's narrow defi-
nition of effective competition left many cable sys-
tems free to set their own rates in a market in which
competition was virtually nonexistent.52
Section 621 of the 1984 Cable Act stated that "[a]
franchising authority may award ... [one] or more
franchises within its jurisdiction."'' 5 However, that
language did not prohibit the granting of an "exclu-
sive" franchise in a geographic area.54 Thus, local
franchising authorities were able to discourage com-
peting systems from obtaining a franchise by impos-
ing economic and legal barriers such as a "universal
service" requirement and restrictive land and equip-
tomers, were not addressed in the 1984 Cable Act. Id.
44 See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 8, pa-
ras. 177-88.
" Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 611, 612, 621, 623.
48 "Franchising authority" is defined in the 1984 Cable Act
as "any governmental entity empowered by the Federal, State,
or local law to grant a franchise." Id. § 602(9).
"" Id. § 623.
48 Basic cable service is defined as "any service tier which
includes the retransmission of local television broadcast signals."
Id. § 602(2).
" Id. § 623(2)(A), (B). The 1984 Cable Act gave the FCC
180 days to define the scope of effective competition. Id.
§ 623(h).
80 In Re Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commis-
sion's Rules to Implement the Provisions of the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 1984, Report and Order, 58 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1 (1985).
51 Id. para. 99.
51 See Neil J. Lehto, Cable TV Rates and Service Charges:
Upholding Municipal Regulatory Authority Under the U.S.
Cable Act, 4 DET. C. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1989).
5 Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 621(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
, Id. An "exclusive" franchise was granted when the local
franchising authority selected only one cable system to service its
community. FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 98 n.142.
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ment regulations. 5 Those factors, plus the high costs
of construction and the impracticality of laying two
or three different sets of cable lines through a geo-
graphic area, resulted in little or no competition for
cable operators. 6 Other provisions of the 1984 Cable
Act retained or expanded governmental authority
over cable systems. Additional regulatory measures
included increasing the FCC's responsibilities in the
areas of equal employment opportunities, technical
standards and pole attachments." The 1984 Cable
Act also codified the FCC's ban on cross-ownership
that limited the telephone companies' and television
broadcast station licensees' ability to enter the video
programming market. 8 Section 611 of the 1984
Cable Act re-established the leased access channel
requirements struck down in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. and granted franchising authorities the power
to require cable operators to designate channel ca-
pacity for public, educational or governmental use.59
Additionally, section 612 of the 1984 Cable Act pro-
hibited federal, state and franchising authorities from
requiring a cable operator to set aside more than fif-
teen percent of designated channel capacity for com-
mercial use60 by persons unaffiliated with the cable
operator. 1
Judicial decisions in the mid-1980s led to further
deregulation. In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,12
the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the FCC's "must
carry" rules, which required cable operators to
"' FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, paras. 132-37. The uni-
versal service criteria required a second cable system seeking to
compete with an existing cable franchise to serve the entire mar-
ket. Id. para. 134.
86 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 2(a)(2), 106 Stat.
1460, 1460 (1992).
'7 Id. sec. 4 and sec. 6, § 634.
8 Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613(a)(b), 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
Id. § 611(b).
60 "Commercial use" is defined as "the provision of video
programming, whether or not for profit." Id. § 612(5)(B).
61 Id. § 612(b)(1)(C).
62 Quincy Cable T.V. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom., National Association of Broadcast-
ers v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
6" Id. at 1463. Cable operators were required to carry the
following local broadcast signals: (1) all commercial television
stations within thirty-five miles of the community served; (2)
other stations in the same market; and (3) all stations "signifi-
cantly viewed in the community." Id. at 1440.
64 Id. at 1461.
68 Id. at 1463. The FCC's modified "must carry" rules im-
plemented in response to the Quincy decision required cable sys-
tems with twenty to twenty-seven usable activated channels to
devote at least seven channels to carriage of qualified broadcast
transmit local broadcast signals upon request and
without compensation, were unconstitutional and in
violation of the First Amendment.63 The court held
that the FCC had failed to establish a substantial
governmental interest for the "must carry" rules and
that the "broadly drafted" "must carry" rules indis-
criminately protected all local broadcasters regardless
of whether the broadcaster's viability was threatened
by cable. 4 The Quincy decision, however, did not
find the "must carry" rules per se unconstitutional
and did not prevent the FCC from modifying those
rules. 5
Subsequently, the FCC's revised "must carry"
rules were challenged and struck down in Century
Communications v. FCC. 6 The D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in Century applied the O'Brien test,67 and it
held that although the FCC's revised rules elimi-
nated the more extreme demands of the "must
carry" requirements, the new rules continued to vio-
late the Constitution because the FCC had failed to
show that the revised rules furthered a substantial
governmental interest that would justify restrictions
on the cable operators' rights under the First
Amendment.6 '
2. The Effects of Deregulation and the Rise of the
Cable Industry
Limited rate regulation, cross-ownership bans, de
facto exclusive franchises, as well as the elimination
signals, and cable systems with more than twenty-seven usable
activated channels had to devote up to twenty-five percent (25%)
of its signal capacity to qualified stations. In re Amendment of
Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Tel-
evision Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 1 FCC
Rcd. 864, paras. 150-51 (1986), recon. denied, 2 FCC Rcd.
3593, rev'd sub nom., Century Communications Corp. v. FCC,
835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.), clarified, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292
(D.C. Cir.), clarified, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
67 In Quincy and Century, the D.C. Circuit applied the
O'Brien test to the First Amendment challenge of the FCC's
"must-carry" rules. The Supreme Court articulated the O'Brien
test as follows:
We think it clear that a government regulation is suffi-
ciently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the government; if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to 'the furtheranace of that
interest.
United States v. O'Brier, 391 U.S. 367 37T7(1968-).
68 Century Communications Co., 835 F.2d at 304.
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of rules pertaining to distant signals, syndicated ex-
clusivity and "must carry," gave cable operators ex-
tensive freedoms in a market with little or no direct
or multichannel competition. As a result, statistics in
the FCC's 1990 Cable Report to Congress 9 reflected
a tremendous growth in the cable industry.70 Accord-
ing to the FCC Cable Report, available cable pro-
gramming services had doubled since the 1984 Cable
Act and annual spending on programming had trip-
led.7' Furthermore, the cable industry's revenue had
more than doubled "from $8.5 billion in 1984 to
$17.7 billion in 1989.1172
While indicating that there had been an increase
in customer complaints regarding the price and qual-
ity of service and that the lowest price tier of cable
service "had risen faster than the general rate of in-
flation," the Commission also noted that the price
increases had leveled out since the 15.5 percent in-
crease in 1987." 3 Furthermore, the FCC found that
despite the sharp rate increase in 1987, cable rates
for all services increased at a rate only slightly
higher than inflation and that "the average price of
basic cable when measured on a per-channel basis
ha[d] increased at a rate significantly lower than in-
flation during [the years 1987 through 1990]." 7 4
Lack of cost data prevented the Commission from
coming to the conclusion that rate increases reflected
an abuse of market power.7 5 The FCC found that
other cost factors such as increases in the number of
services, channels and new programming needed to
be considered.7 1
The Commission also noted in the FCC Cable
Report that potential competitors had complained of
anticompetitive conduct on the part of the cable in-
dustry due to an increase in vertical integration and
horizontal concentration of cable multiple system
owners.77 The FCC acknowledged that deregulation
had served its goal of expanded service to consumers,
"9 The 1984 Cable Act required the FCC to submit a report
to Congress on the status of rate regulation of cable services and
to make recommendations as to what actions Congress should
take with regard to the condition of the cable industry. Pub. L.
No. 98-549, § 623(h), 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
'o FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 3.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. para. 5.
74 Id. para. 33.
75 Id. para. 19 n.35.
76 Id.
77 Id. para. 7. "Vertical integration" is the " common own-
ership of cable systems and program networks, channels or ser-
vices." Id. para. 77 n.127. "Horizontal concentration" is the
measure of control in the cable industry "based on shares of sub-
but determined that it was time to review the status
of cable systems in the video programming indus-
try.78 The findings of the FCC Cable Report fore-
shadowed future regulatory and competitive changes
in the video programming market.
After issuing the FCC Cable Report, the Commis-
sion modified its definition of "effective competition"
so that more cable systems would be subject to basic
service rate regulation under the 1984 Cable Act.79
In place of the three-signal standard, the FCC found
that a cable system was subject to effective competi-
tion, and thus exempt from rate regulation, if "six
unduplicated over-the-air broadcast television signals
[were] available in the entire cable community; or an
independently owned, competing multichannel video
delivery service [was] available to 50 percent of the
homes passed by the incumbent cable system and
subscribed to by at least 10 percent of the homes
passed by the alternative system within the incum-
bent cable system's service area." 80 Many other
changes in cable regulation were to follow.
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Increasing Competition in the Cable Market-
place with Other Video Programming Service
Providers
In its 1990 Cable Report to Congress, the FCC
recommended increasing competition in the cable
marketplace, rather than imposing additional regula-
tions on cable operators, in order to reduce the mar-
ket power problems of the cable industry.8' Follow-
ing the issuance of the FCC Cable Report, the FCC
modified its rules governing multipoint distribution
service ("MDS"), eased the restrictions on network/
cable and telephone/cable cross-ownership, pro-
moted direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") service, and
scribers served by individual cable companies through their own-
ership or control of numerous local cable systems." Id. para. 72.
" Id. paras. 4, 7.
7' In re Reexamination of the Effective Competition Stan-
dard for the Regulation of Cable Television Basic Service Rates,
Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 4545, para. 1 (1991)[hereinafter Effective
Competition Standard Report and Order]. The FCC authorized
franchising authorities to regulate the basic service rates of cable
systems not subject to effective competition. Id.
'0 Id. The Commission refers to "homes passed" as "the
number of homes to which cable service is currently available
whether or not a given household subscribes to cable service." 47
C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(2)(ii) (1991).
8' FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 10.
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considered the new local multipoint distribution ser-
vice ("LMDS"). In addition, a recent opinion in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reduced the number of satellite master an-
tenna television ("SMATV") facilities subject to
FCC and local regulatory requirements.82
1. Current Competitors to the Cable Industry
While cable television is the main provider of
video programming, technological advancements and
special consumer needs resulted in the development
of other video programming service providers.
SMATV systems arose in 1979 as an outgrowth of
satellite-delivery services and the lack of cable in
many U.S. apartment complexes.8 3 SMATV em-
ploys receive-only satellite earth stations directed at
video programming satellites, as well as master an-
tennas to intercept over-the-air broadcast signals and
to redirect those signals through wires installed in an
apartment building.84 SMATV systems generally
serve individual residents in apartment buildings,
condominium complexes and trailer parks.8"
In Beach Communications v. FCC, the court
struck down section 602(b) of the 1984 Cable Act
and an FCC decision that brought external, quasi-
private SMATV facilities-but not internal or
wholly-private facitilites-within the definition of a
"cable system," thus requiring external SMATV
providers to obtain a local cable franchise.8 6 The
Beach court found that definitional distinction to be
unconsitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.8" Thus, the Beach court
expanded the number of SMATVs that would not
be subject to the FCC service requirements or local
franchising requirements, giving some SMATVs a
competitive regulatory advantage over cable systems.
82 Beach Communications v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3393 (U.S. Dec. 1,
1992)(No. 92-603).
11 BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 13, § 13.01.
84 Id.
11 THOMAS F. BALDWIN & D. STEVENS McVoY, CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS 340 (2d ed. 1988).
" Beach Communications, 965 F.2d at 1105.
87 Id.
Os BALDWIN & McVoy, supra note 85, at 332.
80 BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 13, § 15.07[1l.
00 BALDWIN & McVoy, supra note 85, at 334-35.
o' Id.
o2 Id. at 332.
03 Id. at 334. Those DBS systems would utilize Ku band (12
- 14 GHz) technology allowing for high-power, high-frequency
transponders. Id. Ku band satellites cover only a small portion of
Unlike SMATV, which employs larger antennas
for "community reception" to be distributed to a
group of users via cable, DBS systems use individu-
ally-owned antennas that are smaller and pick up
satellite signals for direct reception by the sub-
scriber. 8 High-power transmissions allow DBS sys-
tems to deliver video services to remote rural areas
that cable systems are unable to reach.89 The ability
of DBS to compete with cable is limited by the num-
ber of channels DBS can provide, the local zoning
requirements restricting the size of the antennas, and
the high costs associated with such services."0 How-
ever, future improvements in DBS technology may
allow consumers of direct reception programming to
use smaller, less expensive dishes." Currently, DBS
utilizes the C-band satellites, which are the same
satellites used to transmit cable system program-
ming."' Future DBS technology will be able to use
satellites in the Ku-band (12-14 GHz).93 The use of
those frequencies will allow subscribers to purchase
smaller, less expensive satellite dishes.94 That may
improve the economic viability of DBS in competi-
tive cable markets. DBS's potential ability to carry
high definition television may also increase its capa-
bility to compete effectively with cable systems. 9
8
Multichannel multipoint distribution service
("MMDS"), although originally envisioned as a
business service, has also evolved into a provider of
video entertainment programming.9" MMDS is an
expanded multipoint distribution service ("MDS")
that resulted when the FCC reallocated spectrum in
the 2.5 - 2.69 GHz band and permitted instructional
television fixed services ("ITFS") to lease its excess
capacity to MMDS operators, thus making more
channels available to MDS.97 MMDS is a form of
"wireless cable" that provides multichannel video
service similar to cable television by using microwave
channels instead of coaxial cable.98
the United States, so several satellites would have to be used. Id.
at 334-35. The FCC has defined DBS assigned to this 12 GHz
band as a "radio communications service in which signals from
earth are retransmitted by high power, geostationary satellites
for direct reception by small, inexpensive earth terminals." In re
Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to
Direct Broadcast Satellites for the Period Following the 1983
Regional Administrative Radio Conference, Report and Order,
90 F.C.C.2d 676, para. 1 n.1 (1982).
04 BALDWIN & McVoy, supra note 85, at 334.
' BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 13, § 15.01.
98 Id. § 16.04[1][b].
0 BALDWIN & McVoy, supra note 85, at 337; see also In
re Instructional Television Fixed Service, Report and Order, 94
F.C.C.2d 1203 (1983).
11 In re Amendment of Parts 21, 43, 74, and 94 of the Com-
mission's Rules Governing Use of the Frequencies in the 2.1 and
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Although MMDS faces technical problems with
line-of-sight transmissions that limit the number of
homes it can serve and with the use of unsightly an-
tennas that are susceptible to bad weather, it is less
costly than traditional cable service." In 1990, the
FCC modified the rules governing MDS in order to
"strengthen wireless cable service as a multichannel
competitor to cable television service."' 00 Some of the
more notable rule changes included eliminating the
MDS multiple-ownership restrictions,'"' "facilitat-
ing modifications to reduce interference for existing
MDS stations, thereby accelerating the introduction
of service on additional channels," and "prohibiting
conventional cable operators from holding licenses or
leases for MDS facilities in their franchise areas."' 0 2
A year later, in the same proceeding, the FCC real-
located H-channels designated for private opera-
tional fixed microwave to MDS in order to increase
the number of channels available for distribution of
video entertainment.10 3
Notwithstanding those changes, an enormous
backlog of MDS applications at the FCC blocked
MDS as a competitive force in the cable market-
place.1"4 To ease that backlog, the FCC imposed a
freeze beginning April 19, 1992, on the filing of ap-
2.5 GHz Bands, Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 6410, para. 2
(1990)[hereinafter MDS Report and Order].
11 BALDWIN & McVoy, supra note 85, at 339.
100 In re Amendment of Parts 21, 43, 74, 78, and 94 of the
Commission's Rules Governing Use of the Frequencies in the
2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, Second Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd.
6792, para. 2 (1991)[hereinafter MDS Second Report and
Order].
101 Id. para. 2 n.6. Originally, the ownership restrictions
were imposed to promote competition within the MDS markets.
See MDS Report and Order, supra note 98, para. 8.
.0. MDS Second Report and Order, supra note 100, para. 2
n.6.
203 Id.
104 In re Amendment of Parts 21, 43, 74, 78, and 94 of the
Commission's Rules Governing Use of the Frequencies in the
2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7
FCC Rcd. 3266, para. 5 (1992).
10 Id. para. 19.
106 In re Amendment of Parts 1, 2 and 21 of the Commis-
sion's Rules Governing the Use of Frequencies in the 2.1 and
2.5 Ghz Bands, Report and Order, PR Dkt. No. 92-80, FCC
93-31 (Jan. 14, 1993).
107 Id. para. 2.
10' In re Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.501
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Eliminate the
Prohibition on Common Ownership of Cable Television Systems
and National Television Networks, Report and Order, 70 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1531, para. 1 (1992)[hereinafter Network/
Cable Cross-Ownership Report and Order](petitions for recon-
sideration pending). As early as 1970, the Commission had im-
plemented a cross-ownership ban to protect the growth of the
plications for MDS channels.0 5 On January 14,
1993, the Commission adopted new MDS rules
designed to streamline the filing and processing of
MDS applications and to prevent the filing of specu-
lative MDS applications. 1 6 The FCC modified
MDS regulation to "inspire vigorous competition
and greater diversity of consumer choices in the mul-
tichannel video delivery marketplace.
1 0 7
2. Future Competitors to the Cable Industry
In another move to promote competition in the
cable industry, the FCC modified its network/cable
cross-ownership rules.'0 8 In its 1992 Report and Or-
der, the FCC relaxed the network/cable cross-own-
ership rules and permitted networks to own cable
systems, but restricted network ownership to ten per-
cent of homes passed by cable systems nationwide,
and locally to fifty percent of homes passed in an
Arbitron area of dominant influence ("ADI"). 0 9
The local limits did not apply where the network-
owned cable system encountered a "competing" sys-
tem. " With that modification of the cross-owner-
ship rules, the Commission sought to foster a "di-
verse and competitive video marketplace, without
cable industry that prevented television networks and broadcast
stations from owning cable systems. Id. Section 613(a) of the
1984 Cable Act codified the FCC's broadcast/cable cross-owner-
ship rule that prohibited the licensee of a broadcast television
station from becoming a cable operator where the broadcaster's
grade B contour covered a portion of a cable system's commu-
nity. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613(a). However, the 1984 Cable
Act did not codify the FCC's network/cable cross-ownership
rule prohibiting national television networks from owning cable
systems. Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Report and Order,
infra, para. 2 n.4. Thus, the FCC was able to modify its ban on
network/cable cross-ownership to allow the networks entry into
cable television ownership.
109 Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Report and Order,
supra note 108, paras. 18-20. ADI is "areas of dominant influ-
ence." See ARBITRON RATINGS: TELEVISION, 1986-1987 ADI
MARKET GUIDE, vol. 1, p. xxiv. Arbitron defines ADI as an
"exclusive geographic area consisting of all counties in which the
home-market commercial stations, and satellite stations reported
in combination with them, receive a preponderance of total view-
ing hours." Id.
11 Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Report and Order,
supra note 108, para. 20. The Commission calculates the availa-
bility of a competing multichannel video delivery system by di-
viding the number of homes passed by an alternative delivery
service by the number of homes passed by the incumbent cable
system. 47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(2)(ii) (1991). The Commission
notes that for purposes of the network/cable cross-ownership
rule, a "'competing' multichannel competitor also must be capa-
ble of providing carriage of local broadcast signals integrated
within its service." Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Report
and Order, supra note 108, para. 20 n.43.
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imposing excessively burdensome restrictions on
broadcast networks or cable systems.""'
While modification of the network/cable cross-
ownership restrictions was easier due to the absence
of congressional legislation, the FCC found it more
difficult to circumvent the telephone/cable cross-
ownership prohibitions. Not only did the FCC's own
rules prohibit telephone companies from directly
providing video programming to subscribers in their
local service area, the Modified Final Judgement
("MFJ") and the codification of the FCC's tele-
phone/cable cross-ownership rules in the 1984 Cable
Act also limited the telephone companies' ability to
provide video programming.
In 1991, Judge Harold Greene reluctantly lifted
the ban that prohibited the telephone companies
from providing information services, including cable
television.112 That decision gave the FCC the option
of modifying its telephone/cable cross-ownership
rules. Although the 1984 Cable Act had impeded the
FCC's capability to revise its rules to allow local ex-
change carriers ("LECs") to directly own cable sys-
tems in their local exchange area,"" the FCC as-
serted its authority in its 1992 Second Report and
Order to modify the cross-ownership rules to allow
the LECs to provide video programming indirectly
via a multiple video programmer.' This service has
become known as "video dialtone.""' In the future,
technological advances in integrated services digital
network ("ISDN") and in fiber optics will enable
telephone companies to send such video images over
telephone wires." 6 Video dialtone will also contain
additional features that will allow the subscriber to
.. Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Report and Order,
supra note 108, para. 1.
112 United States v. Western Electric Co., 767 F. Supp. 308
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
"' Section 613(b) of the 1984 Cable Act codified the FCC's
telephone/cable cross-ownership rule prohibiting any common
carrier from owning cable systems. Pub. L. No. 98-549,
§ 613(b)(1).
14 In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Own-
ership Rules, Sections 63.54 - 63.58, Second Report and Order,
Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 7 FCC Rcd. 5785, para. 36
(1992)[hereinafter Telephone/Cable Cross-Ownership Second
Report and Order], pet. for recon. pending, pet. for review dock-
eted sub nom., Mankato Citizens Telephone Co. v. FCC, No.
92-1404 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 9, 1992), Memorandum Opinion
and Order on Reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 5069 (1992), pet.
for review docketed.
15 As a provider of video dialtone service, the telephone
company is limited to five percent voting or nonvoting ownership
of the video programmer. Telephone/Cable Cross-Ownership
Second Report and Order, supra note 114, para. 36.
select and store programming, replay portions of
programming and create tailored menus."'
One of the FCC's purposes in allowing telephone
companies into the cable television market is to pro-
mote the implementation of a nationwide broadband
fiber network."' Another of the Commission's main
goals in modifying the ownership restrictions is to
"increas[e] competition in the video marketplace.""' 9
Although the FCC's rules governing video dialtone
are an alternative to eliminating the telephone/cable
cross-ownership ban, the FCC continues to put pres-
sure on Congress to allow the telephone companies
to directly provide video programming in their ser-
vice areas. 20 Recently, Congress introduced two bills
that proposed to eliminate the telephone/cable cross-
ownership restrictions, subject to certain
safeguards.' 2 1
Furthermore, on December 17, 1992, Bell Atlan-
tic filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia challeng-
ing the constitutionality of section 533(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934, which prohibits tele-
phone companies from providing video programming
in their service areas. 122 The Bell Atlantic complaint
asserted that section 533(b) was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech and violated its First
Amendment rights.' The complaint also claimed
that enforcement of section 533(b) violated the Equal
Protection Clause2 by discriminating against tele-
phone companies, and deprived the telephone com-
panies of their Fifth Amendment right to use their
property for "constitutionally protected expres-
sion.""' The complaint pointed out that the objec-
... See Cindy Skrzycki, 'Data Highway' Plan Costs May
Decline, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1993, at G1.
..7 Telephone/Cable Cross-Ownership Second Report and
Order, supra note 114, para. 12.
"' See Randall M. Sukow and Joe Flint, FCC poised to
ease telco-cable ownership ban, BROADCASTING, July 13, 1992,
at 6.
n1 Telephone/Cable Cross-Ownership Second Report and
Order, supra note 114, para. 1.
120 Id. para. 135.
... S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2546, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
12 Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and In-
junctive Relief, Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v.
United States, (E.D. Va.)(No. 92-1751-A), filed Dec. 17, 1992
[hereinafter Bell Atlantic Complaint].
123 Id. at 4-5.
12 Id. at 11. The Equal Protection Clause states "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend V.
121 Bell Atlantic Complaint, supra note 122, at 11-12.
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tive of section 533(b)-"prevent[ing] the develop-
ment of 'local media monopolies' "-has failed given
the high concentration of the cable industry and the
lack of local competition.' 26
On December 10, 1992, the FCC initiated a
rulemaking proceeding that proposed the introduc-
tion of a new, potentially significant competitor to
the cable television industry local multipoint distri-
bution service ("LMDS").12 The Commission, by
redesignating a portion of the 28 GHz band to
LMDS, enabled LMDS to utilize high-frequency
microwaves to transmit multichannel video program-
ming, local telephone services and interactive two-
way video communications that are comparable to
the quality and versatility of fiber optics without the
need to wire the community.' 2 In its LMDS Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, the FCC sought to in-
crease the video programming options and services
for consumers while providing additional competition
to cable systems.' 29
B. Reregulation and the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
Although the FCC has implemented policies seek-
ing to increase competition in the video program-
ming market, Congress, on October 5, 1992, enacted
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992, which imposed wide-ranging
126 Id. at 7.
12' In re Rulemaking to Amend Part 1 and Part 21 of the
Commission's Rules to Redesignate the 27.5 - 29.5 GHz Fre-
quency Band and to Establish Rules and Policies for Local Mul-
tipoint Distribution Service, Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
Order, Tentative Decision and Order on Reconsideration, CC
Dkt. No. 92-297, FCC 92-538, (Jan. 8, 1993)[hereinafter
LMDS NPRM. The FCC found that LMDS was distinct from
other types of multipoint distribution services in light of the
unique cellular distribution format technology of LMDS. Id.
para. 4.
228 Id. para. 8; see also Jube Shiver, Jr., TV's New Fron-
tier: FCC Proposes Cellular-Style Delivery System, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1992, at B5.
12' LMDS NPRM, supra note 127, paras. 3, 16.
130 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
231 Id. sec. 2(a)(1). Congress found that the monthly rates of
the lowest priced service increased forty percent for more than
twenty-eight percent of cable customers since deregulation of the
cable industry. Id.
112 Id. sec. 2(a)(2). Congress found that the extensive costs
involved in constructing more than one cable facility in a geo-
graphic area limited a subscriber's options in selecting a compet-
ing cable company. Id.
2 2 Id. sec. 2(a)(4). Congress found that the cable industry
was highly concentrated, thus creating barriers to entry for new
regulations on the cable industry.' The 1992 Cable
Act went beyond the recommendations set forth in
the 1990 FCC Cable Report. In section 2 of the
1992 Cable Act, Congress stated its findings with re-
gard to the cable industry's increase in monthly
rates, 3' lack of local competition,' 3 2 barriers to en-
try,' 33 affiliate favoritism,"" deprivation of ser-
vices13' and threat to free television.1
6
1. Congressional Objectives
Congress stated that its main purposes in imple-
menting the 1992 Cable Act were to control cable
rates, improve customer service and promote compe-
tition in the video programming market."' In section
2 of the 1992 Cable Act, Congress stated that it
sought to protect consumer interests where cable sys-
tems were not subject to effective competition and to
ensure that cable operators did not have undue mar-
ket power."' Legislators and industry participants
opposed to the 1992 Cable Act questioned the Act's
purported objectives and asserted that attempts by
Democrats in Congress to pass the allegedly "pro-
consumer" cable bill and to override President
Bush's veto were aimed at embarrassing President
Bush in a very heated 1992 election year. 39 None-
theless, advocates of the 1992 Cable Act maintained
that it was "pro-consumer" and "pro-
competitive."" 40
programmers which, in turn, reduced the diversity of media
voices available to the consumer. Id.
I'l Id. sec. 2 (a)(5). Congress found that the cable industry
was vertically integrated and that many cable systems and pro-
gramming entities had common ownership. Congress noted that
horizontal concentration and vertical integration encouraged af-
filiate operators and programmers to favor one another and ex-
clude nonaffiliates from carriage. 1d.
2'l Id. sec. 2 (a)(6), (7). Congress found that, absent carriage
requirements, consumers would be deprived of a diversity of
viewpoints that could be obtained with "multiple technology me-
dia." Id. Consumers would also be deprived of access to local
noncommercial educational programs. Id.
136 Id. sec. 2(a)(12). Congress found that the increase in
cable television service had lead to a reallocation of advertising
revenue from broadcast to cable systems which threatened the
viability of local broadcast stations. Id. sec. 2(a)(13). It also de-
termined that the government had a substantial interest in main-
taining free local television programming, particularly because
not all consumers could afford cable television as an alternative
to terrestrially broadcasted programming. Id. sec. 2(a)(17).
2M7 See Mike Mills, In Senate, A Strong Majority Again
Bucks Regulation, 50 CONG. Q. 2925, 2926 (1992).
128 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 2(a)(16).
128 See Mike Mills, Bush Asks for a Sign of Loyalty, Con-
gress Changes the Channel, 50 CONG. Q 3147, 3147-48 (1992).
140 Id.
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2. "Pro-Consumer" Provisions of the 1992 Cable
Act
The 1992 Cable Act, in amending section 623 of
the Communications Act of 1934, require the FCC
to establish regulations ensuring "reasonable rates"
for the basic service tier within six months of the
passing of the Act by Congress.141 As in the 1984
Cable Act, cable systems subject to effective competi-
tion would not be governed by FCC rate regula-
tions. 42 In the 1992 Cable Act, however, Congress
implemented a definition of effective competition that
is broader than the FCC's 1991 definition so as to
subject virtually all cable systems to rate
regulation.1
43
The 1992 Cable Act mandates that basic tier ser-
vice at a minimum consist of the following: (1) any
signal of any television broadcaster that was pro-
vided to the subscriber by the cable operator (not in-
cluding superstations);'" (2) public, educational and
governmental access programming ("PEG"); and (3)
''must carry" local commercial and noncommercial
broadcast stations.' 45 In order for subscribers to ob-
tain access to any other tier service, the 1992 Cable
Act requires subscription to the basic service tier.' 46
The 1992 Cable Act also contains a buy-through
prohibition that prevents a cable operator from in-
sisting that a customer subscribe to a tier, other than
the basic tier, as a condition to accessing video pro-
gramming offered on a per-channel or per-program-
14 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 3, § 623. Franchising authori-
ties may regulate the rates of cable service in their area by sub-
mitting a written certification to the FCC. If the certificate is
approved, a franchising authority must still be regulate the cable
system's rates in accordance with the FCC's rules. Furthermore,
the FCC can deny the certificate and preempt the franchising
authority's jurisdiction. Id. sec. 3, § 623(a).
142 Id. sec. 3, § 623(b)(1). The 1992 Cable Act defines "ef-
fective competition" as:
(A) fewer than 30 percent of the households in the
franchise area subscribe to the cable service of a cable
system;
(B) the franchise area is-
(i) served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel
video programming distributors each of which offers com-
parable video programming to at least fifty percent of the
households in the franchise area; and
(ii) the number of households subscribing to program-
ming services offered by multichannel video programming
distributors other than the largest multichannel video pro-
gramming distributor exceeds fifteen percent of the house-
holds in the franchise area; or
(C) a multichannel video programming distributor op-
erated by the franchising authority for that franchise area
offers video programming to at least 50 percent of the
households in that franchise area.
ming basis. 4
In implementing the aforementioned rate regula-
tions, Congress requires that the FCC take into ac-
count the rates charged by cable systems subject to
effective competition; the direct costs of providing
signals carried on basic service tiers; revenues ob-
tained from advertising for programming on basic
service tiers; costs associated with franchise fees and
with the provision of PEG programming; and rea-
sonable profits for cable systems.'48 In addition to
basic tier rate regulation, Congress gave the FCC
the authority to regulate any "unreasonable" rates
for higher-tiered services.' 4 Moreover, the 1992
Cable Act requires the FCC to consider several fac-
tors when adjudicating complaints of "unreasonable"
rates on the higher tiers, including: the rates of simi-
larly situated cable systems, the rates of cable sys-
tems subject to effective competition, the rate history
of the suspect cable system, its capital and operating
costs and its revenues.' 5 0
Another "pro-consumer" provision in the 1992
Cable Act is the requirement that cable systems
carry the signals of local commercial and noncom-
mercial television stations.15' These mandatory sig-
nal carriage requirements are similar to the "must
carry" rules found unconstitutional in Quincy and
Century. 52 However, the number of signals that
cablecasters would be compelled to carry vary under
the 1992 Cable Act depending on the number of use-
able activated channels on the cable system.'53 For
Id. sec. 3, § 623(l)(A)-(C).
143 Compare Effective Competition Standard, supra note 79,
para. 1 with 1992 Cable Act, supra note 142.
114 "Superstations" are stations that secondarily transmit
their signals beyond the local service area. Pub. L. No. 102-385,
sec. 3, § 623(b)(7)(iii).
145 Id. sec. 3, § 623(b)(7)(A).
146 Id.
147 Id. sec. 3, § 623(b)(8). "Tiering" is the packaging and
sale of programming, usually in a cumulative fashion, that forces
subscribers to "buy-through successive tiers in order to subscribe
to each higher-tiered service . . . ." In re Implementation of Sec-
tion 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992, Tier Buy-Through Prohibitions, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, MM Dkt. No. 92-262, FCC 92-540,
para. 2 (Dec. 11, 1992).
141 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 3, § 623(b)(2)(C).
149 Id. sec. 3, § 623(c).
1"0 Id. sec. 3, § 623(c)(2).
151 Id. sec. 4, § 614.
"I See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
153 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 4, § 614(b). The 1992 Cable
Act defined "activated channels" as "those channels engineered
at the headend of a cable system for the provision of services
generally available to residential subscribers of the cable system,
regardless of whether such services actually are provided, includ-
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cable systems with more than twelve useable acti-
vated channels, the cable operator is required to
carry local commercial television signals on up to
one-third of its channel capacity."" Cablecasters are
only obligated to carry low power stations if there is
not a sufficient number of local commercial stations
to fill the required channel capacity."' Additionally,
certain cable operators are required to carry a mini-
mum number of local non-commercial educational
stations. 56
As an alternative to "must carry," the 1992 Cable
Act allows broadcasters to negotiate with cable oper-
ators for retransmission consent. 5 ' The 1992 Cable
Act states that, one year after the enactment of the
1992 Cable Act, a cable operator is not permitted to
retransmit the signal of a broadcast station without
either the express consent of the originating station
or a decision by the broadcast station to carry its sig-
nal under section 614.158 The 1992 Cable Act does
not prohibit the broadcaster from requesting fees for
the right to retransmit its signals.' 59
The 1992 Cable Act also requires the FCC to is-
sue rules governing customer service requirements. 6 °
The rules must include standards for "(1) cable sys-
tem office hours and telephone availability; (2) in-
stallations, outages and service calls; and (3) commu-
nications between the cable operator and the
subscriber (including standards governing bills and
refunds)." 161 Local franchising authorities are to en-
force the standards issued by the FCC and may even
impose additional standards that exceed the Com-
mission's requirements.
6 2
ing any channel designated for public, educational, or govern-
mental use." Id. sec. 2, § 602(c)(5)(1). The 1992 Cable Act de-
fined "usable activated channels" as those "activated" channels
"of the cable system, except those channels whose use for the
distribution of broadcast signals would conflict with technical
and safety regulations .... ." Id. sec. 2, § 602(c)(18).
154 Id. sec. 4, § 614(b)(1)(B).
'6 Id. sec. 4, § 614(c)(1). That provision of the 1992 Cable
Act was not effective until the FCC completed its rulemaking
procedure on the mandatory commercial carriage requirements.
See Self-effectuating Provisions of the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Public Notice
(Nov. 5, 1992). In contrast, the 1992 Cable Act provision that
required cable operators to carry a minimum number of local
noncommercial educational systems became effective December
4, 1992, sixty days after the new law's enactment. Id.
156 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 5, § 615. Cable systems with
thirteen to thirty-six usable activated channels had to carry the
signal of at least one local noncommercial educational television
3. "Pro-Competitive" Provisions of the 1992 Cable
Act
To promote competition in the video programming
industry, the 1992 Cable Act contains provisions
governing the award of franchises, ownership restric-
tions and program access. Under earlier regulations,
a cablecaster had to obtain a cable franchise from the
local authority in order to operate its cable system.'6 3
In cases where the 1984 Cable Act did not prohibit
the granting of de facto exclusive franchises, cable
systems were permitted to operate in a relatively un-
competitive marketplace. 6 4 Thus, the 1992 Cable
Act amends section 621 and prohibits a franchising
authority from granting an exclusive franchise to a
cable operator and from "'unreasonably refus[ing] to
award' an additional competitive franchise."'6 5 Fur-
thermore, the 1992 Cable Act permits local or mu-
nicipal authorities affiliated with franchising author-
ities to operate cable systems. 66 The municipal
authority, unlike other cable operators, is not re-
quired to obtain a franchise in order to provide cable
service under the 1992 Cable Act.'
Another pro-competitive provision in the 1992
Cable Act sets forth new requirements for video pro-
gramming distribution. 6 The provision requires the
FCC to prescribe regulations that prohibit cable op-
erators with an attributable interest in the provision
of satellite cable programs from "unduly or improp-
erly" influencing the program provider regarding
"prices, terms and conditions of sale" of program-
ming to unaffiliated multichannel video program-
ming vendors. 6 9 The cable operator's affiliated net-
work is also prohibited from discriminating in the
"prices, terms and conditions of sale" among mul-
station. Id. sec. 5, § 615(a)(3). Moreover, cable systems with
more than thirty-six usable activated channels had to carry the
signals of three local noncommercial educational stations. Id. sec.
5, § 615(e).
157 Id. sec. 6, § 325(b)(1)(B).
158 Id.
159 Id.
1"0 Id. sec. 8, § 632(b).
lei Id.
162 Id. sec. 8, § 632(c)(2).
e ' Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 621(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2779, 2786
(1984).
164 Id. § 621(a)(1).
16' Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 7, § 621(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460,
1483 (1992).
166 Id. sec. 7, § 621(0(1).
167 Id. sec. 7, § 621(0(2).
16. Id. § 628.
169 Id. § 628(c)(2)(A).
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tichannel video distributors, with some exceptions.'70
Furthermore, exclusive contracts between cable oper-
ators and satellite programming providers are pro-
hibited in areas unserved by cable as of the date of
enactment of section 628 of the 1992 Cable Act.
17
In areas served by cable, exclusive contracts will be
granted only if the FCC finds that it is in the public
interest.
712
The 1992 Cable Act also contains an ownership
restriction provision that is aimed at promoting com-
petition within the cable industry.'77 As amended,
section 613 prohibits cable operators from owning
MMDS and SMATV systems "separate and apart
from any franchise cable service, in any portion of
the franchise area served by that cable operator's
system.' 74 Ownership of SMATV and MMDS sys-
tems existing as of the date of enactment of section
613 of the 1992 Cable Act is exempt from that re-
striction.' Amendments to section 613 also require
the FCC to impose subscriber and channel occu-
pancy limits upon cable system owners.'7 6
III. MEETING CONGRESSIONAL OBJEC-
TIVES WITH MORE STREAMLINED
CABLE LEGISLATION
A. The FCC and the Conflicting Demands of the
1992 Cable Act
The FCC faces a monumental task in complying
with the 1992 Cable Act. The Commission must es-
tablish reasonable rates for cable subscribers while,
at the same time, ensuring reasonable profits for the
cable companies.' While certain provisions of the
1992 Cable Act mandate rate regulation to meet the
Act's goal of establishing "reasonable" rates, other
provisions impose additional costs upon the cable in-
170 Id. § 628(c)(2)(B). The affiliated vendor was not prohib-
ited from establishing different prices, terms and conditions
which take into account differences in costs of creation, sale, de-
livery, transmission of satellite cable programming, as well as
economies of scale, cost savings and other direct and legitimate
economic benefits associated with the distributor's number of
subscribers. Id.
171 Id. § 628(c)(2)(C).
172 Id. § 628(c)(2)(D).
171 Id. sec. 11, § 613.
174 Id. sec. 11, § 613(a)(2).
... Id. sec. 11, § 613(a)(2)(A).
178 Id. sec. 11, § 613(f)(1)(A). Section 613 requires the
FCC to prescribe rules that establish "reasonable limits on the
number of cable subscribers a person is authorized to reach
through cable systems owned by such person, or in which such
person has an attributable interest." Id. Section 613 also re-
quires the FCC to prescribe rules that establish "reasonable lim-
dustry which will make it difficult for the FCC to
lower cable rates and ensure cable operators' "rea-
sonable" profits. The extent to which the FCC bal-
ances the 1992 Cable Act's conflicting demands in
the rules it promulgates will ultimately determine
the impact of the Act on the cable industry.
1. "Pro-Consumer" Objective: "Reasonable" Rates
Section 623 of the 1992 Cable Act requires the
FCC to formulate a "reasonable" rate for the basic
service tier of cable systems. 1 1 Section 623 also di-
rects the Commission to establish criteria for identi-
fying, on a case-by-case basis, "unreasonable" rates
on cable programming services 179 beyond the basic
service tier. s° Those requirements create several
conflicts for the FCC.
First, the Commission must establish an accurate
rate regulation methodology while simultaneously
keeping administrative burdens low. 8' Second, the
FCC must balance the determination of a "reasona-
ble" rate with the assurance of a "reasonable" profit,
where the 1992 Cable Act imposes additional costs
on the cable industry.' s2 Third, the Commission may
have to limit its regulation of "unreasonable" rates
on cable programming services or risk losing the pre-
mium services on higher tiers, where the cable oper-
ators' revenue is constrained by basic tier
requirements.
While it is uncertain whether Congress intended
the FCC to lower existing cable rates or to primarily
control prospective rate increases, it is clear that the
FCC must establish a "reasonable" rate.183 The
1992 Cable Act does not define what is meant by a
"reasonable" rate. Pursuant to the 1992 Cable Act,
the FCC issued its Notice of Proposed Rule Making
its on the number of channels on a cable system that can be
occupied by a video programmer in which a cable operator has
an attributable interest . . . ." Id. sec. 11, § 613(f)(1)(B).
117 Id. sec. 3, § 623(b)(2)(C)(vii).
171 Id. sec. 3, § 623(b)(1).
179 "Cable programming service" is defined as "any video
programming provided over a cable system ... other than video
programming carried on the basic service tier ... and video pro-
gramming offered on a per channel or per program basis." Id.
sec. 3, § 623(k)(1)(2).
ISO Id. sec. 3, § 623(c)(1)(A).
181 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 3, § 623(b)(2)(A).
182 In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, MM Dkt No. 92-266, FCC 92-544,
para. 94 (Dec. 24, 1992)[hereinafter Rate Regulation NPRM].
183 Id. para. 5.
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governing rate regulation which tentatively con-
cluded that Congress intended the Commission to es-
tablish a standard for reasonable basic tier rates that
balances the statutory goals 84 and the factors listed
in section 623(b)(2)(C)(i-vii). 85 These factors are
the rates charged by cable systems subject to effective
competition, direct costs of providing signals carried
on the basic service tier (including retransmission
consent, revenues obtained from advertising for pro-
gramming on the basic service tier, cost associated
with franchise fees, and the provision of PEG pro-
gramming) and a reasonable profit for the cable
system.' 6
In its Rate Regulation NPRM, the Commission
surmised that it would not employ a cost-of-service
(or rate-of-return) methodology to determine "rea-
sonable" rates for cable systems.'8 7 Based on its ex-
perience, the FCC held that cost-of-service regula-
tion would provide little incentive for cable operators
to improve their efficiency and quality of service.'8
Instead, the Commission considered establishing a
"benchmark" price with which the cable system's
basic tier rate would be compared.'89
In creating the rate regulation methodology, how-
ever, the FCC determined that it must also consider
the 1992 Cable Act mandate that requires the FCC
to minimize the administrative burdens on subscrib-
ers, cable operators, franchising authorities and the
Commission itself. 90 Thus, in trying to calculate a
"reasonable" rate, the FCC must deal with the con-
flict between the need to establish an accurate bench-
mark and the need to minimize administrative bur-
dens. 19' Although a benchmark designed to more
accurately reflect the attributes of individual systems
would require costly collection of data, a benchmark
based on a more simplified formula would risk mis-
calculation, which in turn could "allow low-cost sys-
tems to charge rates substantially above cost or re-
184 Id. para. 31. "The goal of Section 623(b) is to protect
subscribers of any cable system that is not subject to effective
competition from rates that exceed the rates that would be
charged if such a cable system were subject to effective competi-
tion." Id. para. 16 n.31.
199 Id. para 31.
186 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 3, § 623(b)(2)(C).
197 "Cost-of-service" regulation establishes a formula to en-
sure that the company gains enough revenue to recover its costs
of providing the service. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Dominant Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
2 FCC Rcd. 5208, para. 17 (1987).
188 Rate Regulation NPRA'I, supra note 182, para. 58.
' Id. para. 33. The FCC compared this benchmark rate to
the price cap methodology by pointing out that where the bench-
mark is not based on costs, there is an increased incentive to
quire higher cost systems to charge below-cost
rates."' 92 The FCC recognized that this conflict
could lead to a trade-off between such costs.' 93
Hence, the Commission suggested that cost-of-service
analysis could be used by high-cost systems that may
be forced to set rates below costs. Such an analysis
could serve as a "safety valve" to prevent confisca-
tory rates.' 94
The FCC must also consider how its rate regula-
tion regime will affect the programming on the basic
and higher tiers. If the FCC allows recovery of the
direct costs of channels in the basic tier, this could
provide an incentive for the cable operator to retain
highly valued programming on the basic tier.'95 If
recovery is not permitted, the consumers could lose
highly valued programming on the basic subscription
level.' 96 However, implementation and calculation of
these expenditures would be more burdensome and
costly to cable systems, the FCC and consumers.
The Commission's task of establishing a "reasona-
ble" rate is further undermined by the 1992 Cable
Act's imposition of additional costs on the cable in-
dustry. Section 624A of the 1992 Cable Act man-
dates the FCC to assure that cable operators make
their equipment compatible with the equipment used
in other consumer electronic mediums such as televi-
sions and video cassette recorders.' 97 Not only will
that increase costs for cable operators, but it will also
increase the risk of theft of service.' Furthermore,
section 632 of the 1992 Cable Act requires the FCC
to impose customer service requirements on cable
systems that expand office hours, increase telephone
availability and improve service governing installa-
tions, power outages and service calls.' In addition
to the costs of complying with the 1992 Cable Act,
the FCC must also consider the other related costs
created by the mandatory signal carriage and
franchise requirements.2"'
improve efficiency and quality of service so as to increase savings
(or profit). Id. para. 36.
190 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 3, § 623(b)(2)(A).
191 Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 182, para. 36.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. The FCC has expressed its concern that certain ap-
plications of rate regulation could violate the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on the taking of property without just compensation.
Id. para. 33 n.66.
5 Id. para. 54.
196 Id. para. 36.
197 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 17, § 624A(b).
10 Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 182, para. 60 n.90.
199 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 8, § 632(b).
'00 Id. sec. 4, § 623(b)(2)(C)(ii).
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In its calculation of a "re
must also examine the cost
the retransmission consent
Cable Act.2"' The FCC st
would be met by its consid
providing signals to subscri
Signal Carriage NPRM, t
cluded that fees given by
change for retransmission
costs.203 Where the 1992 Ca
broadcasters from receiving
their signals, retransmission
ditional costs on the cable o
lar broadcast channels to co
a direct contravention to the
lowering cable rates, it also
cult for the FCC to establ
rate and a "reasonable" pr
Even if additional costs o
up basic rates, the subscrib
in terms of the variety and
ming he will receive. This i:
must balance a "reasonabl
ble" profit by imposing rest
rate, that mandate may fi
higher prices on other tier
mine the "pro-consumer" o
scribers with a "diversity o.
by increasing prices on hig
stifling the growth of new
vices. As a result, the Coin
ance its regulations govern
on higher tiers with the pi
providing subscribers with
and information, given th
constraints on basic tier ser
2. "Pro-Competitive"
Competition
The 1992 Cable Act's m(
ments governing the award
easonable" rate, the FCC restrictions and program access will spur competition
s, if any, associated with and thus be more effective in reducing rates and im-
requirements of the 1992 proving cable service than the provisions on rate reg-
;ated that this obligation ulation, "must carry" and retransmission con-
eration of direct costs in sent-particularly in light of the conflicting demands
ibers.2" 2 In its Broadcast of these latter requirements. Section 7 of the 1992
he FCC tentatively con- Cable Act does not permit franchising authorities to
cable companies in ex- grant exclusive franchises to cable systems, and it
would qualify as direct further provides that a local authority may not un-
ible Act does not prohibit reasonably refuse to award an additional
fees for retransmission of franchise.20 ' That section also allows municipal au-
consent may impose ad- thorities to operate cable systems.2" 6 The introduc-
perator to provide popu- tion of cable systems that can directly compete with
nsumers. Not only is that systems that presently operate under "exclusive"
:1992 Cable Act's goal of franchises may significantly influence the rates that
makes it even more diffi- cable operators charge their customers. Indeed, the
lish both a "reasonable" FCC Cable Report stated that "where cable systems
ofit for the cable systems. compete head-to-head, per channel rates for basic
f compliance do not force service are generally significantly lower than the na-
er may ultimately suffer tional average. "207 In addition to lowering customer
quality of the program- rates, the increased competition can lead to improved
s because where the FCC service for subscribers. 20 8
e" rate with a "reasona- Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act, which places
trictions on the basic tier restrictive requirements on the cable operators with
rce the FCC to accept regard to programming access, may increase the
s.2" That would under- ability of SMATV, MDS and DBS to compete ef-
bjective of providing sub- fectively with the cable industry. Under section 612
f views and information" of the 1992 Cable Act, those multichannel video pro-
gher-tiered programs and gramming providers that are not affiliated with cable
cable programming ser- operators cannot be subject to discrimination with
mission will have to bal- regard to prices, terms and conditions of sale of pro-
ing "unreasonable" rates gramming.2' 9 Furthermore, a cable operator is pro-
ublic interest objective of hibited from influencing the decisions of its affiliated
a variety of viewpoints program provider on prices, terms and conditions of
e cable systems revenue sale of programming that the affiliated vendor pro-
tvice. vides to an unaffiliated distributor.210 Although stud-
ies indicate that more programming has been made
Objective: Increasing available to "wireless cable" services, the FCC con-
cluded that some network programmers continue to
negotiate on disparate terms and conditions with the
odification of the require- wireless services.' In response, section 612, as
of franchises, ownership amended by the 1992 Cable Act, will allow unaffili-
201 Id. sec. 6 § 325(b)(3)(A). The constitutionality of the
"Cmust carry" and retransmission consent provisions in the 1992
Cable Act have been challenged in court. If those provisions are
eventually struck down, the direct costs associated therewith will
no longer be a factor in rate regulation. See Plaintiff's Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Turner Broadcast-
ing Systems, Inc. v. F.C.C., (D.D.C.) (No. 92-2247), filed Oct.
5, 1992.
202 Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 182, para. 31 n.60.
202 In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Broadcast Signal Car-
riage Issues, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Dkt No.
92-259, FCC 92-499, para. 68 (Nov. 19, 1992) [hereinafter
Broadcast Signal Carriage NPRM.
204 Id. para. 94.
20 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 7, § 621(a)(1).
20 Id. sec. 7, § 621(0(1).
1.. FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 67.
208 Id.
209 Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 7, § 621.
210 Id.
211 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 101. Some pro-
gram suppliers have charged SMATV systems fifteen to twenty
percent more than cable operators. See GOODALE, supra note 11,
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ated distributors in the SMATV, MMDS and DBS
services more access to programming, thus increasing
the variety of services that those distributors can pro-
vide and making them more attractive to subscribers.
Furthermore, section 11 of the 1992 Cable Act re-
stricts cross-ownership between cable operators and
SMATV/MMDS systems within their franchise ar-
eas and reflects Congress' "concern that common
ownership of different means of video distribution
may reduce service competition." '212 In its Ownership
Limits NPRM, the FCC pointed out that it had al-
ready promulgated rules restricting cross-ownership
of cable systems and MMDS. l a The Commission
proposed the adoption of similar rules to restrict
common ownership of cable systems and
SMATV.214  Such cross-ownership prohibitions
could be beneficial in promoting competition among
video program providers in a given market, as long
as the restrictions do not prevent the provision of
video service to consumers where cross-ownership
may be the only means of distributing video pro-
gramming in a franchise area.
215
B. The Impact of FCC Decisions Promoting Com-
petition in the Cable Marketplace
While Congress imposed regulations on the cable
industry to stem what it perceived as anticompetitive
behavior, the FCC continued to promote the idea of
addressing those concerns by promoting competition
in the marketplace. The FCC's relaxation of the net-
work/cable cross-ownership rules may provide some
immediate relief in terms of increasing competition
in the cable market.21 The impact of the rule modi-
fication will be measured by how quickly and effi-
ciently the networks can obtain additional revenue
and apply that revenue to the diversification and dis-
tribution of video programming.2 17
The FCC's modification of its telephone/cable
cross-ownership rules also opens the door to compe-
tition in the video programming market. The tele-
§ 5.08.
212 In re Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable
Television Consumer and Competition Act of 1992, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, MM Dkt. No.
92-264, FCC 92-542, para. 24 (Dec. 28, 1992)[hereinafter
Ownership Limits NPRM](citing Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 46 (1991)).
2I Id. para. 25.
214 Id. para. 26. The FCC interpreted the legislative history
of the 1992 Cable Act as not prohibiting cross-ownership of
SMATV systems classified as "cable systems" under section
602(7) of the Communications Act of 1934. Id.
phone companies' provision of video programming
via a multichannel program provider promises to
present direct competition to cable companies. Al-
though video dialtone is still in the developmental
stage and may not be a viable competitor to cable for
several years, telephone companies such as Bell At-
lantic are already experimenting in providing this
video service.218 Furthermore, if the Virginia court
takes action supporting Bell Atlantic's complaint, or
if Congress passes legislation allowing the telephone
companies to provide video programming to sub-
scribers in their service area, then the telephone
companies will be able to offer a more competitive
means for providing video programming to consum-
ers in addition to video dialtone.
Although the FCC has made some changes in the
rules governing MDS and has reallocated spectrum
to accommodate more MDS licensees, an enormous
backlog of MDS applications has required the FCC
to place a freeze on any additional applications.219
However, the Commission's decision to streamline
the MDS application process may speed up the im-
plementation of more MMDS systems and provide
more competition to cable operators. In addition, the
FCC has recently endorsed LMDS as a potentially
strong competitor to cable systems due to its low
costs and ability to provide services on par with fiber
optics in terms of increased channel capacity and in-
teractive video capabilities.22 ° Like MMDS, LMDS
may have problems with transmission interfer-
ence.221 Nevertheless, if the technical difficulties can
be overcome, LMDS will not only be a viable com-
petitor to cable, but to other wireless services and
telephone companies as well.222
In addition to the aforementioned competitors,
DBS is also emerging as a serious contender in the
video programming market. Hughes Communica-
tions Galaxy, Inc. ("Hughes") and United States
Satellite Broadcasting Company, Inc. plan to launch
DBS satellites by early 1994 with a potential 180-
channel service capacity.223 The Hughes' satellite
215 Id. para. 27.
216 Network/Cable Cross-Ownership Report and Order,
supra note 108, para. 1.
21 Id. para 11.
218 See Paul Farhi, Blockbuster, Bell Atlantic Discussing
'Video-on-Demand' Deal, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1992, at G1.
219 MDS Report and Order, supra note 98, para. 19.
220 LMDS NPRM, supra note 127.
221 See Jube Shiver, Jr., TV's New Frontier: FCC Proposes
Cellular-Style Delivery System, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at
B5.
222 Id.
223 See COMM. DAILY, March 24, 1993, at 10.
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has already signed on programmers, including Dis-
ney Channel and Paramount Pictures.224 DBS will
be particularly competitive in the smaller rural mar-
kets and will be able to offer subscribers a lower fee
than cable systems.225
IV. CONCLUSION
The FCC, Congress and the courts have struggled
for decades to balance regulation and deregulation of
the cable industry in order to avoid anticompetitive
behavior on the one hand, and to encourage growth
and investments in the industry on the other. When
deregulation of the cable industry in the 1980s re-
sulted in a decrease in competition in the video pro-
gramming market, the FCC responded by taking
measures to increase competition among video pro-
gram providers. Congress reacted by imposing new
regulations on the cable industry with the implemen-
224 Id.
tation of the 1992 Cable Act.
While Congress' objective of promoting competi-
tion in the cable marketplace is met through the
"pro-competitive" provisions governing ownership
restrictions, program access and franchise awards,
the rate regulation provisions-coupled with the po-
tential costs imposed by retransmission consent,
"must carry," customer service, and equipment com-
patibility requirements-undermine Congress' "pro-
consumer" objectives. The rate regulation provisions
place difficult and conflicting demands on the FCC
in its implementation of regulations in compliance
with the 1992 Cable Act. Less ambitious cable legis-
lation would have proven sufficient to control cable
rates while allowing for the natural development of
competition in the cable marketplace.
Kathy L. Cooper
225 Id.
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